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Background: Research on “human resources for health” (HRH) typically focuses on the public health subsector,
despite the World Health Organization’s inclusive definition to the contrary. This qualitative research examines the
profile of HRH in six conflict-affected contexts where the public health subsector does not dominate healthcare
service provision and HRH is a less coherent and cohesive entity: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR),
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Haiti, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Somalia.
Methods: The study uses a multiple-country qualitative research design including documentary analysis and key
informant interviews undertaken between 2010 and 2012. The documentary analysis included peer-reviewed
articles, books, unpublished research and evaluations and donor and non-government organisation reviews. A
common thematic guide, informed by this analysis, was used to undertake key informant interviews. Informants
thought able to provide some insight into the research questions were identified from ministry of health organograms,
and from listings of donors and non-government organisations. Local informants outside the familiar structures were
also contacted. In CAR, 74 were interviewed; in Somalia 25; . in Haiti, 45; in Afghanistan, 41; in DR Congo, 32; and in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, 30. In addition, peer review was sought on the initial country reports.
Results: The study discovered, in each healthcare arena investigated, a crowded HRH space with a wide range of
public, private, formal and informal providers of varying levels of competence and a diverse richness of initiatives,
shaped by the easy commodification of health and an unregulated market. The weak regulatory framework and
capacity to regulate, combined with limited information regarding those not on the state payroll, allowed non-state
providers to flourish, if not materially then at least numerically.
Conclusion: When examining HRH, a reliance on information provided by the state health sector can only provide a
partial and inadequate representation of reality. For policy-makers and planners in disrupted contexts to begin to appreciate
fully current and potential HRH, there is a need to study the workforce using conceptual tools that reflect the situation
on the ground, rather than idealised patterns generated by incomplete inventories and unrealistic standards.Background
This paper examines the profile of human resources for
health (HRH) in six fragile and conflict-affected states, se-
lected for the diversity of their social, political and historical
evolution: Afghanistan, Central African Republic (CAR),
Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Haiti, the
Occupied Palestinian Territories and Somalia. It ana-
lyses the available data and the implications of a state-
centric analysis where the reach of the state in the
provision of health services is limited. It points to the
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quality—but nevertheless frequently the most numerous
health service providers in these contexts. We suggest
that the customary focus on HRH in the state health
sector provides an inherently inaccurate picture. We
argue, therefore, that in fragile and conflict-affected
environments there is a need to adopt, in reality not just
rhetoric, the World Health Organization’s inclusive
definition of HRH—“all individuals engaged primarily
in the improvement of the health of populations” [1],
committing to the difficult task of tallying, or at least
seriously estimating, the HRH actually available to
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Modern health systems are pluralistic and often trans-
national in nature, making contemporary HRH a rich
and complex system composed of public, private and
informal operators [2]. The World Health Organization
(WHO) inclusively defines health systems as “all the ac-
tivities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore or
maintain health” [3] and in doing so explicitly recognises
that the health system extends beyond the public health
realm. But the common understandings of the health
system underestimate the size of the health workforce. It
encompasses not just the clinical staff in the formal
arena—medical, nursing, midwifery and other profes-
sionals—but also their managers and administrative staff.
It includes non-professional healthcare providers, such
as community health workers and vaccinators, and all
other employees (such as auxiliary staff, even watchmen)
who work not just in the public subsector but also that
of the private and not-for-profit subsectors. Those in
the informal health subsector must also be considered
[4-6]. Strictly speaking, the WHO definition suggests an
intention that would exclude the many providers whose
aim is just to make a living out of health care—but who
do contribute to some form of health service provision.
But under this definition, market vendors of medicines
and traditional practitioners, the sole healthcare pro-
viders in many rural localities—and the still-preferred
choice in some urban ones—are a part of the HRH.
Most analyses default to an examination of the role of
publicly employed HRH, where the bulk of data is avail-
able. To compound matters, such official data are regu-
larly poor, to the point that even the public portion of
the health workforce is misrepresented [6]. But as we
show in this paper, exploring HRH in fragile and
conflict-affected states exposes the limitations of this ap-
proach. Where the reach of the state, at least in terms of
service provision, is limited and where the classifications
commonly used in HRH do not apply, available data are
inevitably compromised. Furthermore, service provision
is fragmented, and the categories of public and private
providers are blurred. In this context, a full understand-
ing of HRH is not helped by the use of the narrow state-
centric view [7].
The six fragile and conflict-affected countries
Each of the states examined has a different history, yet
they share several commonalities. In each, despite pro-
longed international efforts, state building has largely
failed. With the state elusive, in disarray and frequently
mistrusted, its capacity to afford citizens protection from
conflict and to provide the full range of essential services
is tenuous [5]. Each of the countries examined has
experienced conflict or political instability and a vicious
cycle of insecurity, weak rule of law, a flourishing illegaleconomy, extreme deprivation and, consequently, dele-
terious health outcomes. With the exception of the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, key health indicators
(such as life expectancy, neonatal and infant mortality
and maternal mortality) are dire compared to regional
averages. Table 1 provides an overview of basic health
statistics in each of the case studies.
Study design
This examination of HRH is one component of a larger
study examining the provision of health services in six
fragile and conflict-affected states. The project was
funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
implemented through the Australian Centre for Inter-
national and Tropical Health (ACITH), at the University
of Queensland, using a research team of academics and
independent consultants experienced in, or at least fa-
miliar with, health systems analysis in distressed con-
texts. The overall purpose of the project was to provide
greater understanding of the provision of health services
in such environments and to explore how health systems
react, adapt and evolve in response to total or partial
state failure. The findings of other components of the
larger study have been published in peer-reviewed publi-
cations and in detailed country reports [7-11].
The study followed a case study design [12], using
primarily qualitative methods: documentary analysis and
key informant interviews between 2010 and 2012. The
qualitative methods allowed for an exploration of how
and in what ways health systems evolve, or might be
evolving, in response to state fragility. This design proved
particularly useful in addressing the research purpose
because of its ability to describe, explore and offer expla-
nations for the phenomena being studied [13-18]. The
documentary analysis used available peer-reviewed arti-
cles, books and “grey” literature—unpublished research
and evaluations and reviews from multilateral and bilateral
donors and non-government organisations. The available
literature outside the health field was studied in some de-
tail, to gain insights about the influence of such turbulent
contexts on the respective healthcare arenas. A common
thematic guide, developed by the research team and in-
formed by the documentary analysis, mapped themes
related to health service provision and the impacts of
social, economic and political disruption on health ser-
vices and HRH. A semi-structured question guide was
developed for the key informant interviews. The use of
the shared thematic guide ensured parallel coverage of
key issues between studies, while individual researchers
were able to respond with flexibility to issues raised by
respondents [19].
In each of the contexts examined, key informant inter-
views were undertaken with participants identified from
ministry of health (MoH) organograms, listings of donors,
Table 1 Basic health indicators for each case study
Life expectancy and mortality Age-standardised mortality rates by cause
(per 100 000 population)
Life expectancy
at birth (years)






Afghanistana 48 45 149 M: 440; F: 352 713 1 117 149 62
CARa 48 42 159 M: 461; F: 470 1 060 870 151 62
DRCa 49 46 170 M: 442; F: 331 932 837 155 68
Haitia 62 27 165 M: 278; F: 227 545 697 52 59
Palestineb 73 13 23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Somaliaa 51 52 180 M: 382; F: 350 736 967 199 46
aData retrieved from WHO, 2012, World Health Statistics; bdata retrieved from UNICEF (2013). At a glance: state of Palestine. Retrieved 11 August 2014
from http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/oPt_statistics.html.
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professionals, based on their health systems engagement
and experience. Non-health informants were also inter-
viewed. Additional key informants were identified by
recommendation and referral from the initial round of in-
terviews [14,16,20,21]. In Haiti, respondents were selected
based on a review of the Ministry of Public Health and
Population (MSPP) organogram and the coordination
list for health organisations. These respondents suggested
other informants including the Cuban Brigade and
representatives of the Département at Cap Haïtien. In
Afghanistan, respondents included representatives of the
Ministry of Public Health, donors, NGOs, other humani-
tarian organisations and UN agencies. In CAR, five of the
seven accessible prefectures outside the capital Bangui
were visited. In Somalia and the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, informants were interviewed about specific
issues related to health and HRH. For reasons of insecur-
ity, interviews with informants in the health sector in
Somalia were conducted primarily in Nairobi, headquar-
ters to most donor programmes in Somalia.
The researchers sought to achieve representative
cross-section across state, private for-profit and not-for-
profit actors, local and international informants, central
agencies and provinces, practitioners and academics.
The total number of interviews for each study was primar-
ily determined by the numbers of individuals identified in
the field as being knowledgeable about the healthcare
arena or other relevant issues and the feasibility of access.
Specific attention was given to the volume of available lit-
erature when planning interview schedules. For Somalia
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, both well docu-
mented, the focus was on corroborating—or challenging
—existing evidence. The numerous interviews undertaken
in the CAR was in compensation for the paucity of
studies, with additional interviews in the CAR reflecting
extended access to five prefectures. The total number of
interviews was as follows: CAR n = 74, Haiti n = 45,
Afghanistan n = 41, DR Congo n = 32, the OccupiedPalestinian Territories n = 30 and Somalia n = 25. The
corroboration of data from informants confirmed that
saturation had been reached within this selection. Key
informant interviews were combined with site visits to at
least one provincial centre in each of the states examined,
with the exception of Somalia. This allowed researchers to
identify and explore discrepancies between official dis-
course and the reality observed on the ground. In relation
to Afghanistan, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and
Somalia, the analysis built on previous work done by the
researchers on their healthcare arenas and facilitated by
the network of contacts established over years of pro-
tracted engagement.
Identified key informants were contacted by phone or
face-to-face, individually briefed on the purpose of the
research and interviewed at their work premises or at an
agreed location, with notes maintained. Interviews were
undertaken in English or French depending on the inter-
viewees’ preference, with all researchers competent in
both languages. All interviews were undertaken following
reading of the project information sheet, outlining the
purpose of the research and the provisions for confidenti-
ality, and emphasised the right to withdraw at any time
and confirming informed oral consent. Table 2 summa-
rises the number of respondents by category and location.
Data analysis
Researchers shared a common process of analysis for the
preparation of each of the case studies. Thematic ana-
lysis was undertaken manually and corroborated with
the research team members. The common thematic
guide, developed before the data collection, provided the
initial themes for analysis, with data from the documen-
tary analysis and key informant interviews integrated in
the findings. The analysis was guided by the broader
project research questions, with a report written for each
of the six contexts examined. Subsequently, the data
were reanalysed with a focus on those themes relating to
HRH. In the draft report writing stages, the researchers
Table 2 Summary of participants by category and locations
Participant category Locations
Afghanistan location Kabul Herat Province
Academic body 2
Afghan hospital 1 1
Afghan NGO 3 2
Bilateral organisations 1
Government 14
International NGO 8 3
Other 1
Multilateral organisations 6
Central African Republic location Bangui Bambari Bimbo Bobele Berberati Ippy Kaga-Bandoro Mbaiki
Ministry Public Health 5 1 1
National organisations 20 1 2
Academic body 4 1
Bilateral organisations 1
CAR health professional 7 8 14 6 2
CAR consultant
Multilateral organisation 7 1
Bilateral organisation 3
International NGO 14 4 1
International consultant 4
Other 2
Democratic Republic of Congo location Kinshasa North Kivu Goma Antwerp Geneva




DRC health professional 1 1
DRC consultant
Multilateral organisation 6 2 2
Bilateral organisation 4 1
International NGO 3
International consultant 3
Haiti location Port-au-Prince Cap Haïtien
MSPP 5 1
Academic (Haïti) 4




Multilateral organisation 8 1
Bilateral organisation 2
International NGO 7 1
Palestine location Jerusalem Nablus Ramallah Gaza Abroad
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Table 2 Summary of participants by category and locations (Continued)




Palestinian National Authority 1
Ministry of Health 4 3
Multilateral organisations 1 1 2
Palestinian NGOs 3
International NGOs 1 2
Folk healer 1
Private firm 1
Somalia location Mogadishu Somalia Nairobi Abroad
Academics 1 1 1
International consultants 2 4
Bilateral organisations
Somali health professional 1 3
Multilateral organisations 7 1
Somali NGOs 1
International NGOs 2 5
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a primary report for each location studied. Initial drafts
of the six different reports were shared with colleagues
regarded as able to provide relevant feedback and in-
sights. This was followed by a review undertaken by the
whole research team. The final reports are available from
the ACITH websitea.
Triangulation of qualitative case study information
involves collecting data from different locations and
cross-checking their consistency from various sources
collected at different times [12-15,22,23]. In this study,
data triangulation was achieved by including a wide
range of documents in the review, interviewing inter-
national and national healthcare experts, presenting
preliminary findings to colleagues experienced in each
study location and undertaking an internal review
processes within the research team. In the case of
Afghanistan and Somalia, subsequent professional visits
by the researchers have allowed confirmation of findings.
These processes helped to improve our understanding of
the various reasons for differences and similarities in the
data and identify areas for further exploration.
Ethics approval for the research was obtained from the
University of Queensland Research Ethics Committee. In
Haiti, the research protocol was shared with the MSPP,
and they were informed of the ethics approval. In the
CAR, the Ministry of Health was informed of the study
and gave formal approval for its health facility staff toparticipate. In the DR Congo and Afghanistan, the pro-
posal was provided to the respective health ministries.
Limitations
Some of the limitations of this study relate to undertaking
research in extremely distressed environments. Security
considerations for the researchers were significant: the
reach of the research was extended considerably by mem-
bers of the team who, as independent consultants, were
not constrained by University of Queensland travel restric-
tions. Each study except Somalia included both central
and provincial visits, though the majority of informants—
both state and non-state, with the exception of the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territories—were concentrated in the
capital and this inevitable capital city bias is an historical
artefact. With additional time and then-relative security,
the fieldwork in the CAR covered significantly more pro-
vincial centres and proportionately larger number of inter-
views reflecting regional differences. Another potential
limitation is that the data for this study has come from
arguably extreme cases of state fragility and may not have
widespread applicability. On the other hand, the weakness
or absence of the state allowed a more in-depth, nuanced
approach and identification of patterns which, while also
present to varying degrees in less distressed settings, are
typically harder to uncover or understand.
In this research, our intent was to refocus the analyt-
ical lens to the HRH system as a whole. Our research
Durham et al. Human Resources for Health  (2015) 13:14 Page 6 of 12uncovered the extraordinary health services activity
beyond the reach of the state, but time, resource con-
straints and limited available data HRH (and many inac-
curacies in available data) prevented a comprehensive
in-depth analysis of the active workforce including the
formal, informal, private, nongovernmental and faith-
based providers, as well as an examination of factors that
determine the demand for HRH and the dynamics of the
formal and informal labour market. Another limitation
of the study was the failure to secure demand-related
data (in other words, client perceptions) in most set-
tings, leaving this for further research. Finally, while the
approach allowed the collection of rich qualitative infor-
mation, the study was also constrained by the inconsist-
ent availability of information in each of the study
locations, resulting in uneven insights in relation to the
different HRH sectors. Lack of documentation hindered
the appreciation of trends and the direction of move-
ment of developments [24].
Accepting the variety of patterns spontaneously occur-
ring in a long-suffering healthcare arena calls for appropri-
ate analytical tools, which supersede the definitions
and indicators applied in stable, better organised and
resourced contexts [25]. For instance, the much refer-
enced “international ratios” of professionals-to-inhabitants
are meaningless in situations where most workers do not
hold a recognised qualification, those who do so demon-
strate questionable skills, and the population concerned is
of unknown size and very mobile. The same fuzziness ap-
plies to health facilities, with atypical services—featuring a
limited range of services or staff with qualifications that
do not conform to usual vocational classifications—vastly
outnumbering standardised health facilities. Relying on
conventional staffing patterns is therefore similarly mis-
leading. A third example may relate to the proportion of
deliveries attended by skilled workers. Without a direct
assessment of the actual skills demonstrated during the
delivery, such indicator is obviously devoid of significance.
Equally, one clinician’s “outpatient consultation” (a com-
mon measure of workload) cannot meaningfully be com-
pared with another’s given the absence in quality control
that regular supervision affords, itself often entirely
absent. Despite these limitations and selecting the case
studies for maximum diversity, the study identifies shared
important commonalities across the six cases.
Findings
In each of the study’s six states, severe deficiencies in
HRH information systems, misdistribution of HRH and
weak regulation and oversight of HRH by the state were
observed. In each case, it became apparent that the read-
ily available data focussed on formally public health
services. Information about the actual practice adopted
by public employees, in fact dominantly privatised, wassorely inadequate. Official data were limited, frequently
irregular, often palpably incorrect and addressed only a
small proportion of human resources [25]. Despite
this, the research provided important qualitative insights
into HRH in these settings, pointing to the implications
for an actual active workforce concealed through the
blurred boundaries of double employment, un-integrated
not-for-profit providers and the unregulated for-profit
private operators, where the bulk of health services is
provided. In each of the healthcare arenas investigated,
the problems faced by HRH are consequences of a com-
bination of economic and governance functions (or dys-
functions). As a result, service provision defaults into
patterns driven by financial considerations and, from
there, the easy commodification of health services.
The uncertain size of the health workforce
In each of the six states examined, an accurate estimate of
the size of the health workforce was unavailable and what
did exist looked incomplete. In most cases, health work-
force data were reliant on personnel records, covering
only salaried staff in the centralised public sector, fre-
quently referring to outdated enrolments. Non-salaried
personnel working within state facilities were not in-
cluded. In the CAR, an unknown but sizeable percentage
of the workforce was reported (and seen) to be entirely
“off-ledger”. Absenteeism among those “on-ledger” was
reported as common and unchecked and may be for rea-
sons both authorised and unauthorised.
In the DR Congo, informants conceded that the total
number of health workers was not known with any cer-
tainty. In the popular mind, every health worker, even
auxiliary staff member, is a nganga, or “doctor” (and every
health facility is a nganga house). In Haiti, there were con-
siderable difficulties in gaining an overview of HRH, their
capacity and their gaps due to an inadequate health work-
force information system, currently under revision. Within
each ministry, the management of human resources (HR)
is under-developed and given a lower rank.
The disconnection between modest service needs (con-
strained by financial factors) and vigorous supply of health
professionals was recognisable in all settings. Despite the
underlying uncertainties about the true size of each work-
force, time series pointed unambiguously towards a sus-
tained growth, particularly in relation to the DR Congo
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, both endowed
with large health training capacity. This trend has been
recognised also in other healthcare arenas, such as in
Angola [26]. Counter-intuitively, an expanding workforce
looks like a recurring feature of the diminished state,
which relinquishes its grip on supply, employment and
professional practice. The profit prospects of healthcare
activities, within a suffering domestic economy, attract
both workers and entrepreneurs.
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sionals and estimates of outward migration were likewise
not available. In Afghanistan, the portion of trained
community midwives going into practice in the public
sector could not be established; many, however, were re-
ported to marry and stop practising, and the use of mid-
wifery training as a bridge to higher academic pursuits
was commonly reported [27]. In Somalia, compilations
of HRH-related data quickly revealed inadequacies,
grossly diverging data, inconsistencies in classification
and limited coverage.
A mal-distributed workforce
In each of the study locations, a number of respondents
questioned the reliability of the HRH data. Despite the
paucity of accurate quantitative data, mal-distributions
by gender, by professional categories and by urban/rural
allocation of health workers were recognisable in all of
the settings examined. In the CAR, for example, HRH
distribution across the prefectures was reported to be
markedly uneven. Successive waves of conflict had con-
tributed to the large-scale flight of qualified staff from
almost every facility in the entire north and north-
eastern prefectures. In those areas, most of the available
formal HRH were employees of not-for-profit providers
allocated according to organisational discretion, an ex-
ample of organisations on the ground making resourcing
decisions rather than far-away ministries of health who
do not have the information or the capacity to deploy
staff productively. Isolated multi-disciplinary teams
existed in the rural south-east due to the intervention of
an international NGO. The far north-eastern prefecture
was reportedly almost entirely devoid of health providers.
Even where an international NGO provided services, they
were available for Sudanese refugees only.
In Afghanistan, trained midwives were unwilling to fill
rural vacancies, preferring unemployment to perceived
undesirable rural appointments. In the absence of female
doctors, female patients were reported to consult with
Afghani community midwives for a range of conditions
rather than see male doctors [23]. The de facto privatised
public health services, with not‐enrolled health personnel
paid only by user fees, were reported to contribute to
overstaffing in areas where people could pay, while there
was understaffing in poor areas. In Haiti, 83% of specialist
doctors were practising in the capital, Port-au-Prince [28].
In some of the states included in the study, violence
against health workers, for example, Taliban threats to
female nurses and midwives in Afghanistan, contributed
to the further distortion of the health workforce. On the
other hand, in some areas, humanitarian agencies pro-
vided superior health services in conflict-affected areas
whereas stable by poor communities with equally poor
health outcomes, continued to be underserved.The centralised nature of the HR system in Haiti also
caused unnecessary delays in replacing medical staff
[29]. The departmental director for the MSPP, for
example, had no authority to hire and fire. This led, for
instance, to anomalies where a clinic director reportedly
had three drivers on the payroll without a car at his
disposal or to a hospital director being allocated five
cleaners instead of the requested five midwives. The pro-
duction of graduates was poorly linked with service
needs. The uncertainty around subsequent employment
by the state or access to specialist training, coupled with
the opportunities for work in the international market-
place, led to high levels of migration of medical graduates
in Haiti. Lack of regulation of educational institutions also
resulted in disparities in the output of different profes-
sional categories. Medical training was preferred over
other categories of health professionals, leaving gaps in
the production of nurses and midwives, for example, and
with training of physiotherapists only initiated following
the 2010 earthquake.
In Somalia, the health workforce had expanded organic-
ally over the years with no link between workforce
requirements and professional training. This was also
observed by the practice of absorbing not only holders of
recognised qualifications but also self-appointed health
workers, as well as “volunteers” who sometimes charged
a fee for service in the absence of salaried workers. As a
result, protracted unemployment in the salaried public
health sector was a common occurrence for health grad-
uates [30]. To redress this, recurrent ministerial instruc-
tions were issued in Somaliland to enrol new batches of
health professionals, regardless of service needs or ac-
tual utilisation. Professionals from the violent central-
southern region migrated to peaceful Somaliland. The
inadequacies of country-wide inventories cannot be
resolved by more thorough counts, which would in any
case become quickly outdated. Stronger insights can be
obtained from local surveys, which were available in
some cases, such as in the eastern DR Congo, Somalia
or the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
Fending for themselves
Those in the informal subsector fend for themselves by
definition: those in the public subsector do so by cir-
cumstance. A perceived inadequacy of salaries, the late
payment of those salaries (in CAR, sometimes for an en-
tire year, only to be written off by presidential decree) and
poor working conditions encouraged staff to work pri-
vately outside their official job (but sometimes within their
working week), work privately inside their official job,
unofficially charging for notionally free services or taking
up other jobs altogether [31]. Ineffective oversight by
line-managers—themselves feeling inadequately paid and
poorly rewarded—only facilitated these self-preservation
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present only once a week. Others were present only once
a month—to receive the pay cheque, leaving the work to
interns [29]. In the CAR, all levels of health workers in
state facilities essentially functioned as stand‐alone entre-
preneurs with minimum overheads. For example, special-
ists and qualified midwives operated private clinics within
the publicly owned hospital infrastructure. An important
reason for professionals in the CAR, Somalia and else-
where to remain employed in the public subsector is that
such an appointment confers status, reputation, credibility
and opportunities which increase market profile—and
market share—in the private subsector. In CAR, qualified
health workers not on the state payroll openly worked
within public facilities on a formally sanctioned fee-for-
service arrangement, with revenues divided at the end of
the month;
Similarly, in the DR Congo, numerous health workers
present in public health units were not on the government
payroll. In Katanga in 2007, for instance, it was estimated
that, out of a total of 6 800 health workers, only about 3
200 were officially employed [32]. This contributed to the
de facto privatisation of nominally public health services
[32]. In Somalia, private practice generates most of the in-
come for a majority of health professionals. A study in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories found three quarters of
government employees interviewed were also working at
NGO or private facilities [33].
In Afghanistan, interviewees indicated that the HR
boundaries between NGOs and the MoPH are fuzzy;
managerial staff members switch between both during
their career. With salaries for health workers in NGOs
at least 50% higher than government salaries, moving to
NGOs, UN organisations, donors and coalition forces
was reported as commonplace. Those less in demand,
such as community health workers, were not afforded
similar opportunities to move, creating a rift between
those who were paid by some NGOs (against official
policy) and those who were not. In Haiti, disparities be-
tween salaries and conditions in the public and private
sectors were reported to lead to apparent paradoxes: a
cleaner working in a cholera treatment centre run by an
NGO, for example, could earn more than a nurse-
assistant of the public clinic to which the NGO centre
was attached. There is only an apparent paradox: the lat-
ter health professionals would have more opportunities
than the former to supplement their income through
charging patients for their services.
There is a strong correlation between the presence of
health workers at any given service delivery point and
the availability of medicines: sales of which may consti-
tute the bulk of actual earnings. Where official supplies
are inadequate or absent, some health workers buy med-
icines in the open market and sell them, with a mark-up,to their captive patients [34]. Expensive products are
often prescribed for their higher returns rather than
their therapeutical value.
The unregulated production of human resources for health
While no figures were available, in most of the six
healthcare arenas examined, the training of health pro-
fessionals was an apparently profitable business judging
by its attractiveness to entrepreneurs. With much up-
ward pressure on quantity to expand class numbers—
often fuelled by the students’ benevolent relatives in the
diaspora—and negligible downward pressure on quality
through absent or nominal regulation, the training of
health staff combined high profit margins with low start-
up costs. This resulted in an unplanned proliferation
of private, for-profit, heterogeneous training outlets. Pre-
vocational education was uneven and suboptimal, often
inappropriate in orientation with a focus on professional
categories with larger earning potential, such as doctors
and pharmacists. In lock-step, the proliferation of hetero-
geneous examining bodies, leading to similarly uneven
competence and certification, matched the expansion of
the training outlets.
According to informants in Afghanistan, a diploma,
far from being a guarantee of a satisfactory level of
knowledge and skills, was rather merely an automatically
awarded certificate delivered upon completion of a
course. The hierarchical nature of Afghani society was
reported to constrain on-the-job training. In a provincial
hospital, for instance, “doctors took questions during
teaching rounds as a personal attack”. The low level of
general education resulting from protracted turmoil also
limited professional development and was reported to be
particularly influential in the failure to redress the male/
female health worker imbalance. Persistent shortfalls in
recruited female health workers in Afghanistan, despite
a doubling of the hardship allowance for female staff,
posed a major obstacle for access of women to health
care. Added to this, misconceived attempts to raise nurs-
ing and midwifery standards contributed to gender
disparities: candidates were required to have completed
secondary education—a situation denying entry for
many rural women.
In the DR Congo, the proliferation of medical schools
and training institutions resulted in an over-supply of
health workers, many with substandard healthcare quali-
fications. According to the Ministry of Public Health,
between 1998 and 2008, the number of faculties of
medicine had increased more than tenfold from 3 to 39.
In the same period, health training schools for allied
health cadres almost doubled from 308 to 578. A fifth of
medical schools were reported to not meet the required
standards, and a quarter had no associated teaching hos-
pital. Nevertheless, these same institutions were allowed
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000 new doctors—of whatever standard—and more than
4 000 new nurses [35].
In Somalia, local entrepreneurs, funded by external
sources, donations from local wealthy people, the dias-
pora and student fees established training institutions
for health professionals. Informants noted that in many
locations across the former Republic of Somalia the
healthcare industry ranks among the top employers, and
enrolling into health training programmes represents an
appealing option for school leavers. In Haiti, the absence
of a training facility accreditation system and the use of
curricula not matched to the needs of the Haitian health
system negatively impacted on health staff performance
[28]. In private nursing schools, the curriculum was
described as “sclerotic and teaching methods 50 years
back”. Several practising physicians complained about
the decline of standards of medical training. Further, the
HRH training industry was reported to have grown
dramatically, apparently saturating the market. Given,
however, that graduates can use their qualifications to
migrate, it seems unlikely that the domestic market for
health professionals will remain saturated for long as
more graduates migrate. Educators, for example, sug-
gested that approximately 80% of doctors migrate on
graduation. In the case of the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritories, training geared to the international job market
was flourishing. Many healthcare staff benefitted from
scholarships abroad, resulting in diversity in standards
and quality of graduates.
In the CAR, many of medical doctors trained in a
7‐year course at the University of Bangui were thought
to have migrated. On the other hand, one informant ex-
plained that “there are many unemployed health profes-
sionals” still in-country, but in the absence of accessible
records, obtaining even a rough assessment was challen-
ging The training of secouristes is a core mission of all
national Red Cross societies, and the CAR branch annu-
ally trains two batches of 50 at each of five sites in
3-month courses or around 500 each year. This basic
training offers a foot on the health worker ladder: half of
all mini-pharma informants claimed to have had Red
Cross training, and secouristes make up most of the vol-
unteers who staff village health posts. In the DR Congo,
approximately 11 000 medical doctors were registered;
only about 5 000 of whom are estimated to be working
in the public sector. Presumably more than half of
graduate doctors migrated, took up other jobs or prac-
tised privately.
In Somalia, health workers could be placed on a con-
tinuum from the “reasonably qualified” (maybe with for-
eign qualifications) to the “indubitably unqualified”, with
most workers falling in between. There was no automatic
correspondence between qualification and competence:some “qualified staff” remaining inside the formal system
with a quasi-academic certificate were incompetent while
some very competent staff (having continued to deliver
services seen as acceptable by customers through decades
of disruption) remained unqualified.
In the six healthcare arenas examined, professional asso-
ciations were found to exist to differing degrees, some-
times if only to demand a tax from new entrants to the
market but rarely, if ever, to provide professional support.
Discussion
The findings pose a question: given the demonstrable
limitations, could a formal health system be said to exist
in any of the six examined contexts? If the criterion for
a health system is the existence of a dynamic mix of
health services and a range of public, private, formal and
informal providers, then the answer may be “yes”
[11,36]. What this study underlines is the observation
that despite the absence—or in some cases, withdrawal
of the state—the healthcare arena and the HRH space
specifically is not a vacuum. This finding distinguishes
this research. Beyond the reach of state services, health
provision is crowded with a range of private actors of
varying competence, public servants turned health entre-
preneurs, and a diverse richness of initiatives, shaped by
the unregulated commodification of health care. While
the specific findings from the six cases cannot be gener-
alised, the privatisation, commoditisation and range of
formal and informal providers offering healthcare ser-
vices has been observed in other weakly governed con-
texts [37,38]. Further, despite differing histories, similar
trajectories were found across the six case studies.
In each of the six healthcare arenas, formal coordin-
ation and regulation systems were either absent, simply
not applied or abused to financially exploit patients and
lower level staff [5]. There was minimal skill develop-
ment or evidence-based practice. As a result, HRH was
governed largely by informal rules and shaped by socio-
economic and political determinants, local culture and
local value systems. With de facto stewardship in the
hands of the market, market forces and profit-based mo-
tivation determined the range and quality of available
health professional training, the distribution of services
and performance. Unregulated training institutions,
financed by student fees, contributed to questionable
training of questionable quality and the (over-) produc-
tion of often under-skilled health cadres with dubious
qualifications. Further, while training for medical doctors
proliferated, the number of trained nurses and midwives
trailed. Poor quality training and the commodification of
health also meant healthcare workers rarely acted as per-
fect agents for patients’ health. Similarly, leaving the
distribution of the workforce to the market results
in disparities in service provision. It exacerbates the
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health systems and can result in catastrophic events for
families [27,38-42]. Elsewhere, the mix of the require-
ment to pay for health services and products, limited
ability to pay and the lack of health insurance have been
shown to result in catastrophic payment while at
the same time payments provide important revenue at
the facility level especially when reimbursements from
the state are frequently delayed [43-45].
Strengthening the role of any putative state to take on
its enabling role and establish governance mechanisms
will be a protracted, incremental exercise, one likely
to take decades to reach a basic level of functioning
[46-49], with no guarantee that it will happen [11]. In
each of the case studies, the fragility of governance
structures is not new; rather, it is chronic and stubborn
to international interventions. Even if a state-based gov-
ernance structure registers progress, it will relate only to
a modest portion of the healthcare market. And publicly
employed health workers will remain subject to market
pressures determined outside the public sphere. Thus, a
focus on building the capacity of the state on its own is
unlikely to result in tangible improvements. Our analysis
suggests that conceptualising the HRH arena at the na-
tional level and focussing on the public health sector is,
to an extent, misleading and provides a parody of reality.
A more useful conceptualisation may be to look at local
healthcare provision arrangements in their diversity in-
cluding formal and informal as well as private and public
elements [50]. This would provide a more holistic un-
derstanding of the HRH resources available to enhance
the quality of health care and enable a piecing together
of a system from the reality of what is, rather than on
the illusion of what is not, drawn from a focus on idea-
lised patterns [5,38,40,50-52]. This more comprehensive
analysis of HRH will allow for the development of strat-
egies to support and develop existing resources, promot-
ing adaptive responses to existing dynamics [5].
The challenge, then, for the international community
is to find ways to effectively engage with the system as a
whole [53], essentially looking afresh at the healthcare
arena and searching out all actors, working out new
ways to engage with them. In other words, it means
recognising the state as merely one actor and finding
ways to at first recognise and then encompass all others.
It means that donors and international organisations
need to learn to work in different ways and extend their
analysis beyond the notion of a state-led health system,
accepting that in fragile and conflict-affected environ-
ments the healthcare space is fuzzy, fluid and fragmen-
ted. It also means accepting risk as an intrinsic part of
change which provides opportunity for learning and
adaptation. To minimise risk, interventions need to be
incremental, combining strategic intent and structuredintervention, while at the same time building in flexibil-
ity for adaptation to take into account emergence and
complexity [54]. Such an approach will also require a
highly flexible financing system that can support local
providers and essential service delivery in the immediate
term while building capacity in the longer term [42].
Realising that most health workers who lack either for-
mal qualifications or actual skills will keep practising even
if officially forbidden to do so points to the measures
needed to resuscitate a moribund workforce. In particular,
new ways need to be found to manage the workforce in
four areas: workforce production, distribution, perform-
ance and coordination and regulation [5,39].
1. In light of the large number of active health
workers, managing them, upgrading their skills and
encouraging positive behaviours should take
precedence over training new ones in most contexts.
Deployment, fulfilled tasks, workloads, terms of
employment, incentives and career prospects need
to be better understood if adequate measures have
to be introduced [39,55,56].
2. An independent and voluntary certification process,
along the lines experimented in Cambodia and
Afghanistan, should be instituted [57]. Precious
insights would be gained about the competence of
practising health workers, their most glaring skill
gaps and the adequacy of existing categories and,
henceforth, of their retraining needs [32,56].
Importantly, more research is needed on
understanding which incentives would make an
untrained medicine vendor, for example, behave
differently: promoting health rather than promoting
what the consumer sees as health, in the context of
no formal regulations and no likelihood of their
execution [35]. Ensuring appropriate and uniform
good quality training is particularly challenging,
especially given many training providers are
privately owned [49,56], and further research is
needed to better understand how to align different
actors’ motivational interests [53].
3. The accreditation of health training institutions
deserves an investment, with the removal of
automatic expectations of enrolment in the state
workforce, if the oversupply of incompetent health
workers has to be reined in. While more attention
needs to be given to strengthening the capacity of
the state to undertake its stewardship role in
developing and enforcing licensing and accreditation
systems [5] given the feebleness of health
authorities, in the interim, a voluntary mechanism
could be offered. If the state is mistrusted or
contested, an international body could be assigned
this role. In an open healthcare market, a reputable
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to abide to norms otherwise ignored [5]. Market
forces should then mould their efforts, and further
research is needed to understand how to develop the
capacity of consumers to demand appropriate and
quality services [49,58]. Further, without linking
production to deployment, accreditation of health
training institutions on its own is likely to bring
limited benefits if not linked to deployment and
retention [5].
4. Normative planning, whereby the health workforce
is projected to expand according to absolute needs,
should be abandoned in favour of contextualised
criteria taking resource and capacity constraints into
due account [56]. Indeed, different service models
and healthcare networks have different HR
requirements, whatever the served population is.
Forecasted financing levels offer a much better
guidance to HRH development than international
norms (themselves the result of averaging vastly
diverse situations) [59,60]
5. Coordination, monitoring, evaluation and regulation
are vital in the strengthening of HRH and should
include a range of stakeholders [5]. Where the
capacity of the state to coordinate is weak, local
coordination mechanisms can be facilitated by
identifying local governance structures. Given
changes in one system, for example, the HRH
system is likely to impact on other parts of the
broader health system; systematic coordination is
also needed between the HRH system and other
subsystems of the overall health system [44].
McPake et al. for example have demonstrated the
interconnectedness between the HRH systems and
the financing system [44]. Similarly, Bertone and
colleagues observed in Sierra Leone that broader
health financing reform, while not specifically
focused on HRH, had a substantial impact on the
HRH reform process [61].
To conclude, our research highlights the need to
recognise that public health authorities are only one of
many actors in the health field and that reversal of fra-
gility is a long-term commitment and demands a form
of engagement which deliberately aims to harness the
strengths of the diverse actors that provide health ser-
vices. It requires a shift from a reductionist, predictable
and linear view of health systems to one which acknowl-
edges the complex character of health care in severely
distressed environments. Crucially, improving HRH in
fragile and conflict-affected areas requires researchers
and policy makers to embrace the inclusive WHO defin-
ition of the health system. As compelling and easy as it
is to focus on the public sector, this provides a caricatureof reality. A more holistic scrutiny of the sections com-
posing the healthcare arena and of their interactions will
provide a more coherent understanding of the HRH
dynamics in fragile and conflict-affected states. Import-
antly, it will allow identification of windows of oppor-
tunity for novel and experimental interventions. The
approach will not be risk-free and demands tolerance for
ambiguity and uncertainty around the likely effectiveness
of interventions. The dividends will be realised, however,
through the harnessing of the HRH active on the ground
and the practices they adopt to survive. Meaningful
interventions oriented to public goods must cover the
whole market and not only its formal public arm. The
next research agenda should aim at exploring the com-
plex and dynamic structures of supply and demand in
the HRH market in under-governed healthcare arenas,
in order to identify existing or emergent systems of gov-
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